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Abstract: 
 
The paper combines economic and sociological perspectives on organizations in order to 
gain a better understanding of the forces shaping the structures of industrial districts (IDs) 
and the organizations of which they are constituted. To effect the combination , the 
resource based view (RBV) and resource dependency theory  are combined to explain the 
evolution of different industry structures. The paper thus extends work by Toms and 
Filatotchev by spatializing consideration of resource distribution and resource 
dependence. The paper has important implications for conventional interpretations in the 
fields of business and organizational history and for the main areas of theory hitherto 
considered separately, particularly the Chandlerian model of corporate hierarchy as 
contrasted with  the alternative of clusters of small firms coordinated by networks. 
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Industrial districts as organizational environments:  
resources, networks and structures 
 
Introduction 
 
Industrial districts (IDs) present the researcher with a particular organizational 
environment – or a particular way of organizing economic activity – in which 
geographical clustering is just the first step in embedding of firms in their institutional 
context.  In 1995 Jonathon Zeitlin asked ‘why are there no industrial districts in 
England?’. Whatever its accuracy, the question is revealing in so far as the English 
industrial landscape once was populated by many industrial districts (Wilson and Popp, 
2003). The numerous districts of the nineteenth-century have tracked many different 
paths, from total extinction, through mutation to, despite Zeitlin’s question, persistence. 
Clearly, industrial districts are sites of powerful processes of change. We see this even if 
we turn to the ‘homeland’ of the industrial district in the late twentieth-century, Italy, 
where the continuing evolution of districts is eroding characteristics once thought of as 
central to the ‘canonical’ definition (Rinaldi, 2005). What processes are at work as 
districts evolve, change and, in some cases, die, and how, in each case, are those changes 
manifested?  
Recognizing that in industrial districts the social and the economic are inextricably 
linked – that is, that the term implies not simply a particular way of organizing economic 
activity, but also the achievement of that within particular social arrangements – the 
paper seeks to explore these questions by combining both economic and sociological 
perspectives on organizations. We can see the need for this synthesis, and the direction in 
which it should be focused, more clearly through reference to apparently conflicting 
literatures in industrial history; the ‘Chandlerian’ and the post-Fordist/flexible 
specialization, which both tell stories, if very different ones, about the distribution and 
coordination of resources across the economy. The Chandlerian narrative (1962; 1977; 
1990), if we may call it that, is highly economistic in thrust and is predicated on the 
assumed logic of a progressive internalization of resources within the managerial 
corporation. It is the internalization of resources within the firm, necessarily accompanied 
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by their coordination through hierarchy, that is the key to the Chandlerian thesis. The 
flexible specialization literature, on the other hand, both recognizes the possibility and the 
actual existence of alternatives in which resources are widely distributed across many 
organizations and in which the recombination, or coordination, of those resources is 
determined not simply at the level of the individual organization, but also at that of a 
wider institutional context. Thus, this paper focuses on the resource bases and the 
resources dependencies of both firms and districts and on how these interact with each 
other and further drivers to shape the dynamic processes at work in districts. In doing so, 
we build on Toms and Filatotchev’s (2004) framework for the exploration of the dynamic 
linkages between governance, strategy and networks. This approach draws explicitly on 
resource based views (RBV) of the firm and resource dependency (RD) theory. However, 
in making this attempt in the context of industrial districts we also seek to extend the 
Toms/Filatotchev model. Industrial districts are defined in the first instance by their 
spatiality, specifically their spatial concentration. Thus we will consider how spatiality 
impacts on the important elements of the Toms/Filatotchev model, particularly in terms 
of the (spatial) distribution of resources and the (spatial) construction of governance 
structures. In short, just as resources have both physical and organizational ‘locations’, so 
governance arrangements are not aspatial. Some of the underlying principles of our broad 
approach do require, however, some discussion. 
First, we must consider whether the assumption that, both theoretically and 
empirically, the Chandlerian and flexible specialization literatures represent two distinct 
schools with regard to economic growth and development and, if so, whether this 
represents a barrier to our understanding of the processes at work. Each literature draws 
tight correlations between corporate structures and forms and alternative models of 
capitalistic accumulation, namely, mass-production and flexible specialization. Both, 
whether explicitly or not, portray these models as dichotomous and mutually exclusive. 
Sabel and Zeitlin (1985) entitled a seminal article ‘historical alternatives to mass 
production’. More recently Scranton cast his Endless Novelty as being about “[an]other 
side” of the Second Industrial Revolution’ that created ‘technological and organizational 
transformations distinct from, but comparably significant to, the creation of routinized 
assembly, bureaucratic management, and oligopolistic competition’ (1997: 3). Thus, on 
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the one hand, the Chandlerian model, in which scale and scope economies are 
internalised in the large multidivisional firms of managerial capitalism, is most 
commonly associated with the new industries of the Second Industrial Revolution 
characterized by standardization and high throughput. On the other, clustering is equated 
with a small-firm economy of flexibility, reliance upon resource sharing external to the 
individual firm and personal regimes of ownership and management. Structural and 
strategic trajectories are assumed to be quite different.  But history and observation teach 
us that these exclusive differences are not tenable; districts coalesce into corporations or 
come to be dominated by large leader firms, corporations fragment into much more 
distributed systems, and in each case both the distribution and coordination of resources 
are reordered.  Hence our desire to attempt a reconciliation of two apparently different 
traditions in writing about managerial and organizational history. 
Ontologically, our chosen theoretical tools, RBV and RD, also come from very 
different traditions: RBV derives from economics, with its associated biases towards 
positivism, rationality and methodological individualism, while RD owes more to 
sociology. However, we believe, and will attempt to show, that the two, in combination, 
can shed a more revealing light on both the distribution and the use of resources across 
the economy. Indeed, we would claim that both perspectives are needed. 
More specifically , as already indicated, our focus is the dynamics of clustering, and 
transitions from one structure to another.   Particular variables include the numbers of 
firms present in a district and their size distribution, the diversity of the activities which 
they undertake and the balance they strike between internalization and externalization, 
and hence the routes they take to the realization of economies of scale and scope. These 
foci must however, be accompanied by a concern for the architectures of governance with 
which different patterns of resource distribution are associated. These range from loose 
formal networks through associations that span organizations to hierarchical structure , 
including the interplay between co-operation and competition, allowing for many more 
possibilities than the dichotomous Chandlerian and district literatures had previously 
suggested.   
The fusion of these perspectives  highlights the need also for a brief word on writing 
organizational history. As the several emphases in the preceding passages suggest, the 
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two literatures propose very different historiographies. One is almost Whig-like in its 
emphasis on an ineluctable progress. The other, too, initially seemed to propose a parallel 
and equally ineluctable, if unrealized, alternative progress. I Its later expressions 
increasingly  encompass the multiplicity and mutability of possibilities, their contingency 
and path-dependence, and  their subtle relationship with actors (Sabel and Zeitlin, 1997). 
Thus, we also wish to situate this synthesis within a perspective that is not merely 
historically sensitive but historically driven. As historians we do not deploy references to 
history simply as ‘context’ but see history as process, which, through the operation of 
forces such as path-dependence and contingency, plays a central role in the stories we 
wish to tell. History provides a dynamic  test-bed for theories derived from the social 
sciences. 
The paper will be structured in the following way. First we will isolate more clearly 
some of the conceptual gaps we hope to address before discussing in greater depth the 
theoretical tools that we intend to deploy. We will then present a synthesis through which 
it is possible to explore the dynamic interaction of resource bases and resource 
dependencies in the context of the ID and the outcomes of those interactions in terms of 
the various structural properties of districts. We will then move to an examination of the 
drivers behind the interactions explored above. Finally, before concluding, we will return 
to historiographical issues by indicating how resource bases and resource dependencies 
are co-determining over historical time. 
 
 
 
 
Isolating the problem 
 
How are the linkages between resource bases and resource dependence, or governance, 
widely defined, currently conceptualized, with regard to both corporations and districts? 
One approach emphasises how governance factors consist of arrangements for 
constraining managerial opportunism in a principal-agent framework. They include 
monitoring by boards of directors and mutual monitoring by managers (Fama and Jensen 
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1983; Rediker and Seth 1995) and by large outside shareholders (Demsetz and Lehn 
1985), and equity-based managerial incentives that align the interests of agents and 
principals ( Murphy 1985). Monitoring is facilitated by the communication of 
information contained in financial reports and their scrutiny by processes of audit (Jensen 
and Meckling 1976; Watts and Zimmerman 1986). External factors, such as the threat of 
take-over (; Shleifer and Vishny 1997), product competition (; Jensen 1993), and 
managerial labour markets (Fama 1980) may constrain managerial opportunism. At the 
same time, governance and accountability have also been neglected, or left unresolved, in 
the dominant Chandlerian paradigm (Toms and Wilson, 2003).  
However, a broader definition of governance is required than that implied in the 
principal-agent literature. As suggested above, whilst governance is about managerial 
accountability to shareholder principals, it might also be concerned with processes that 
facilitate managerial entrepreneurship, so that shareholders benefit from appropriate 
opportunities (Keasey and Wright 1993; Tricker 1984). Such activities might include 
downsizing and divestment in response to changes in governance (Toms and Wright, 
2002). The issue of governance has also similarly preoccupied the clustering literature. 
Best argues that the technological dynamism of the ‘entrepreneurial firm’ is translated 
into technological dynamism at the level of the district via the ‘collective entrepreneurial 
firm’ defined as a ‘self-organizing agent for change composed of networked groups of 
mutually adjusting enterprises’ (2001: 83). Thus, district dynamics are also dependent on 
governance forms and arrangements, with externalization dependent on the co-ordination 
of interdependent but institutionally dispersed resources. Previous research has 
conceptualized networks as modes of organizing inter-firm activities through 
coordination and cooperation (Grandori and Soda 1995: 184; Toms and Filatotchev, 
2004), an approach extended to districts in the present paper.  
The agency perspective that dominates organisational economics and corporate 
governance theory (Dalton et al. 2003; Fama 1980; Jensen 1993, Hart 1995) also has 
obvious limitations when extended beyond the simple principal-agent relationship, 
specifically when applied to districts, where lateral linkages tend to prevail. The literature 
on districts using transaction cost approaches, meanwhile, concentrates only on these 
lateral linkages, contrasting for example districts dominated by one buyer or seller with 
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districts where decision making is more dispersed (Belussi 1999; Hemmert 1999; De 
Propris, 2001). Similarly, the sociologically orientated literature also concentrates on 
these lateral relationships. From the ‘strong embeddedness’ perspective (Granovetter 
1992: 5; Piore and Sabel 1984; Sabel and Zeitlin 1985; Staber et al. 1996), the function of 
governance systems in the ideal/typical industrial district is to maintain a creative balance 
between co-operation and competition. Whilst the approach is normative, like the more 
positivist transaction cost approaches, the emphasis is on the horizontal policing 
arrangement within the district. 
A very important, though often only implicit, element of sociological approaches is 
the effect of spatial proximity. Spatial proximity of actors in IDs is held to impact 
positively on the structure, operation and effectiveness of networks as governance 
arrangements. As Staber notes, the ‘embeddedness of firms in a distinctive local social 
fabric is a key feature of the industrial district model’ (1996: 148). This deep embedding 
of actors in ‘local social milieu’ directly impacts behaviours because the ‘milieu reflects 
cultural values and shared beliefs about the form and pattern of economic exchange. The 
firms in a district are expected to balance their commitment to collective purposes with 
their own, more specialized objectives’ (1996: 148). Proximity works not only through 
the effects of socialization (Sabel and Zeitlin, 1985) and through the sharing of socio-
cultural attributes, from family ties and political and religious affiliations (Paniccia, 
2002), which work to enhance trust and co-operation, but also through facilitation of 
repeated face-to-face interactions.  Networks as governance mechanisms in IDs thus 
emerge and function somewhat naturally as a result of spatial proximity. They allow, 
amongst other things, for heightened levels of trust and cooperation between actors, ease 
of monitoring and sanctioning of behaviours (Casson, 2003),  facilitating  more effective 
transmission  of tacit knowledge and information (Breschi and Lissoni, 2001). Networks 
as governance mechanisms thus have a (physical) span of control. Thus, we might expect 
to find network connections, and hence governance interactions, densest at the local 
level. Long-distance networks will be constructed differently and will lack the social 
underpinnings that are derived from proximity in IDs (Casson, 2003). Arising less 
spontaneously they will often require conscious construction and thus also are likely to be 
directed to more instrumental ends. These differences mean that local networks will not 
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always serve as good foundations for the construction of long-distance networks. These 
claims have obvious implications when applied to a framework that considers both the 
spatial and organizational distribution of resources.  
It is the purpose of this paper, therefore, to offer a synthesis between the vertical 
relationships incorporated by governance-based principal agent theory and the lateral 
relationships suggested by the economics of clustering. As this brief review suggests, it is 
perhaps through the integration of vertical governance and accountability structures with 
the lateral determinants of competitive and collaborative industry structure that such a 
reconciliation might be achieved. The objective is to use the mechanisms of governance 
and accountability, rooted in resource dependency theory, to explain contrasting 
outcomes in hierarchies, districts and hybrid organizational forms and processes of 
industrial transformation. 
In order to do this the paper develops an analytical model to explain industry structure 
and dynamics. Horizontal structure dynamics are explained using the resource based view 
(RBV) of the firm. The RBV is useful because as a theory of firm-level behaviour it 
equates competitive advantage based on the possession of unique or difficult-to-replicate 
assets. Such assets might explain the presence of dominant firms on the one hand, or, on 
the other, where scale-based entry barriers prevent their creation by a single firm, helping 
to explain the emergence of co-operative resource-sharing structures. Vertical dynamics 
are explained by capital dependency theory (Prechel, 2000; Zey and Swenson), as a 
special case of resource dependency so that the presence of vertical monitoring 
arrangements is a function of the degree of such dependence. By separating out capital 
dependence, other resources, such as raw materials and human capital, are treated as 
endogenous. Endogeneity acknowledges that pools of these resources arise as a function 
of past activity, often within the district. Capital dependency emphasises accountability 
mechanisms in terms of governance factors such as ownership structure, roles of 
corporate boards, financial communication and outside investors. Where firms in a 
district experience differing levels of dependence, there will be differences in the 
distribution of power. Both RBV and the capital dependency theory are useful in a 
dynamic perspective as resources are inevitably subject to time-based variations of 
technology and demand conditions inducing product life-cycle constraints. While both 
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are well established in the strategic management literature,  there have been relatively 
few attempts to synthesise them, least of all in a dynamic historical perspective (Toms 
and Filatotchev 2004). This paper extends the Toms and Filatotchev dynamic resource-
governance model incorporating the spatiality of IDs.  
In summary, the principal outstanding task for the clustering research agenda is to 
consider resource location and the sources of internal and external economies of scale 
and scope and to incorporate vertical governance and accountability perspectives. This is 
consistent with the broader implications of the paper, which is to synthesise the RBV 
literature with work on capital dependency to explain the historical development of 
different industry structures. In so doing, the paper also aims to fulfil its fundamental aim 
of highlighting the potential linkages between the Chandlerian and district paradigms, 
reconceptualizing these not as mutually exclusive but as existing on interacting continua. 
If successful, there are important implications for the Chandlerian view, which has 
retained much of its influence as a dominant paradigm in both management theory and 
business history (Whittington et al. 1999; Whittington and Mayer 2000), as well as for 
the institutional and neo-classical views of industrial organization.  
 
Resource distribution, capital dependency and industrial organization 
 
This section aims to synthesize two literatures that assist our understanding of industry 
organization, including in this context both structural characteristics and governance 
arrangements. Governance arrangements refer to the mechanisms whereby organization 
and network members are held accountable to each other and to external resource 
providers. These definitions are used so that the two main areas of theory, the RBV and 
resource dependency theory, can be accommodated into a single model. To begin with, 
the contribution of each area is outlined.  
The RBV concentrates on difficult-to-replicate, firm-specific assets that promote 
competitive advantage. Such resources might include specialized production facilities, 
trade secrets and engineering experience (Teece et al. 1997) and firm-specific 
idiosyncratic knowledge assets (Castanias and Helfat 2001). In the RBV, such firm-
specific factors are traditionally considered as the major drivers of strategic change 
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(Barney 1991, 1997). According to this view, managerial and entrepreneurial resources 
drive growth and diversification (Whittington and Mayer 2000). The RBV has been 
extended to the competence-based theory of the firm in which the firm constructs 
capabilities through internal learning processes (Teece et al. 1997). Where these 
resources are utilised effectively, competitive advantage is achieved through delivering 
value to the customer, in the form of improved products or lower prices (Barney 1986; 
Peteraf 1993). 
A weakness of the RBV is that it says relatively little about resources that are not 
shared by firms. Extensions to the RBV deal with rents in factor markets (Barney, 1986) 
and rents arising from spatial location (Lippman and Rumelt, 2003), but there has been 
no direct analysis of competitive advantage at the level of the district. Even so,, as the 
literatures on clustering and networking suggest, resource-sharing arrangements may also 
promote competitive advantage (Arthur 1990). As Mathews notes, citing Silicon Valley, 
in ‘the real economy’ firms are often ‘placed in positions of mutual dependence,’ because 
resources ‘usually span firms’ (2003: 128, 133). As sharing arrangements within districts 
frequently involve the transmission of tacit knowledge and  innovation ‘spill over’ the 
configuration of non-firm specific assets can have a major impact on strategy and 
structure, highlighting the importance of governance systems as proximate 
communication channels. Swann et al. 1998; Jaffe 1989; Feldman 1994). Extending 
Marshallian perspectives, dynamic external economies of scale occur where there are 
accumulations of local knowledge as a result of repeated interactions along established 
channels (Glaeser et al. 1992). According to this view, clustering of firms in industrial 
districts, trade associations and other networked organizations may be promoted through 
sharing trade secrets and drawing on local pools of experience and skilled labour (Amin 
and Thrift 1994). These shared resources form the basis of agglomeration-based external 
economies of scale (Kamien et al. 1992). In summary, the RBV requires extension so that 
competitive advantage is a function of resource acquisition, however accessed. The RBV 
should consider the location of resources, inside and outside the firm, in order to explain 
the full range of possibilities for industrial organization and associated governance 
arrangements. 
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Another perspective allowing such an extension is the suggestion that mass production 
and flexible specialisation lie at opposite ends of a continuum. In industrial organisation 
terms, this is the equivalent of the trade-off between scale economies and allocative 
efficiency (Oughton and Whittam 1997: 6). Internalisation of production in large-scale 
units creates scale-related, cost-reduction benefits to customers on the one hand, whilst 
on the other there are the incentive and price reduction customer benefits associated with 
the absence of market power. It might be added that in the former case there are few 
benefits from clustering, since the necessary resources are internalised within the firm 
through integration, whilst diversification requires product and market dispersion. Only 
in relatively competitive and geographically proximate industries are there likely to be 
external economies of scale benefits from clustering.  
However, these performance benefits have been analysed without reference to the 
governance of districts, which is another important dimension potentially explaining their 
dynamic development. Resource dependence theory assumes that firms respond to 
external pressures, but their power relative to these pressures may be contingent on the 
configuration of the resource-user/resource-provider relationships (Pfeffer 1992, 1997; 
Frooman 1999). Capital dependency, as a specific case of resource dependency, is 
therefore important because it influences the degree to which the district is externally 
monitored and thus the extent governance arrangements can or cannot draw on localized 
foundations. Where the district is relatively self-sufficient, there is little incentive to 
subject the district to the scrutiny of external monitors. In turn, resource dependency 
reflects the growth rate of the industry. In rapidly expanding or evolving industries, it is 
entirely probable that the district will require outside resources in order to finance and 
produce the required asset base. In this instance local networks are unlikely suffice as 
instruments for acquiring resources. Conversely, in contracting industries the reduction of 
dependency will have the effect of making districts more difficult to police from outside, 
whilst the district members may use their internal networking arrangements to promote 
capacity sharing, output and price restrictions and other related strategies. Here, in 
contrast to much of the embeddedness literature, proximity can prove a liability, with 
districts becoming increasingly inward-looking (Cookson 2003).  
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These and similar strategic actions formulated by the district members are likely to be 
a result of the dynamic interaction of the resource availability and resource dependency 
characteristics of the district. Where external stakeholders provide resources, it is 
necessary to put in place arrangements for co-ordination and monitoring to mitigate 
opportunistic behaviour by network members (Gulati et al. 2000; Jones et al. 1997). Such 
accountability processes emphasize information flow, as well as offering a broader 
perspective than the Chandlerian view of technology as the exploitation of associated 
scale and scope economies (Casson 1997; Hamilton and Feenstra 1995; Langlois and 
Robertson 1995). 
Thus, Piore notes how successful district governance requires that the ‘economies that 
are external to particular productive units be internalized as parameters for some higher-
level organization decision-making unit’ (1992: 437). However, he also goes on to argue 
that as this higher-level function cannot be fulfilled by the market, then, for example, the 
‘relationships … organized by contracts’ recorded by Marshall meant that he ‘did not 
observe industrial districts’ in the sense understood by contemporary network scholars 
(Piore 1992: 437). Whilst this point might be contentious, it is nonetheless indicative of 
how, in districts, contracts are incomplete, and openness and secrecy depend on patterns 
of control through agency and delegation (White 1992: 93).  
At the same time, evolutionary economics suggests that the interaction of governance 
arrangements and resources may be intricately linked with and central to the development 
of new and existing capabilities. Increasing emphasis is now being placed on ‘patterns of 
institutedness, the nature of the rules, practices and procedures that maintain and modify 
institutionalized relationships…that give distributed innovation processes their stability. 
They … provide the frameworks for generating and combining knowledge’ (Metcalfe 
2001: 577). It is through such processes that there emerge fresh possibilities (Metcalfe 
2001). As the added emphases suggest, these arguments are as applicable at the level of 
the district as they are at that of the firm. Such arguments also inject further dynamism 
into the district by, at least partially, making the rate of growth a function of 
technological change and a property or outcome of the district as a system of resources 
and attendant capabilities. 
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In making this point, we endogenize technological change as a factor in our model, if 
only partially. However, it is worth noting that, for analytical purposes, we take 
technology and resource bases as a given at any particular point in time, such as the point 
from which a process of transition in industry structure begins. Further, not only is 
technology both dynamic and partially endogenous, it exists in a complex interplay with 
products and markets. We acknowledge this and with it that entrepreneurs will actively 
attempt to reshape both products and markets in ways that are favourable. However, 
without evading these complexities, we again note how in analytical terms our principal 
focus is on the mechanisms mediating dynamics rather than the forces giving rise to 
them. 
The importance of the interaction of governance arrangements and resource 
distribution might be most acute in relation to intangible assets, particularly those 
‘untraded interdependencies’ described as attaching to ‘the process of economic and 
organizational learning and co-ordination’ (Storper 1997: 21). For Marshall (1919) these 
are those ‘mysteries of trade’ that are to be found somehow ‘in the air’, but nonetheless 
according to the RBV form the source of competitive advantage only for the individual 
firm. For the purposes of the model presented below, where resource pools are external, 
for example a trained workforce or a local transport infrastructure, they arise from 
previous firm-specific investments in resources aimed at securing competitive advantage 
for that firm, but now transformed into past (sunk) costs. These sunk costs nonetheless 
remain assets from the perspective of the district. Amongst groups of firms, where direct 
contracting is difficult the circulation and distribution of resources has to be achieved via 
other means, for example, by sharing the costs of generic training. From this perspective, 
‘relational assets’, such as networks, become vital. But the natural spatial limits to trust 
ensure that networks may also restrict access to such scarce resources (Cookson 2003; 
Toms and Filatotchev 2004). As Breschi and Lissoni argue, if ‘epistemic communities’ 
will not disclose their ‘common codebooks’ then they have the power to act in highly 
‘exclusionary’ ways (2001: 989). These contrasting outcomes stress the need for a more 
structured view of governance arrangements in districts. 
In sum, casual awareness of the empirical record must throw elements of the 
Marshallian model, and its more recent manifestations, into doubt. In particular, the 
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literature has too little to say about the impact of the heterogeneity of the positions 
occupied by different actors in the business structures of districted industries. The size of 
firms and their structural positions, in terms of both vertical and horizontal linkages, their 
relative power, and the spatiality of their network connections (are they primarily short 
rather than long-distance, for example?), all influence access to and utilization of 
resources and hence the challenges of allocation and co-ordination facing entrepreneurs 
and managers. These challenges in turn shape priorities, interests, attitudes and 
behaviours within and beyond firm ‘boundaries’. These arguments suggest the need for a 
framework capable of capturing the joint impact of governance and resource issues on 
district organization and characteristics.  
  
 
A proposed synthesis 
 
According to Toms and Filatotchev, ownership and governance structures, allied to 
perspectives on the strategic resource content of business activities, in which ‘managerial 
and entrepreneurial resources drive growth and diversification’ form ‘an important 
context that moderates strategic response’ in periods of both growth and crisis (2003: 70, 
69). Conceptualizing governance in terms of accountability (from transparent to opaque) 
and the resource base of the firm as either narrow or extensive, Toms and Filatotchev 
capture the characteristics of networks with a matrix. In this model ‘the degree of 
transparency will be a function of the degree of dependency on external stakeholders for 
resources’ (2003: 71). Here, resource dependency is linked to the industry growth rate as 
a function of technological change and regulatory environment, and thereby ‘impacts on 
the social construction of networks’ as a governance mechanism, a construction that also 
takes place in a spatial context. Technology and the location of productive resources also 
impact on the necessity for and ability of firms to internalize resources, or, conversely, 
how successful they are in constructing and maintaining effective trust-based networks. 
The latter is typically believed to be easiest at the local level. A high dependence on 
resources external to the district itself may demand the creation of quite different 
linkages.  
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The major simplification in this approach is that it does not accommodate separate 
resource ownership and governance functions at the level of the network as well as at the 
level of the individual firm. Although the present synthesis builds on the Toms and 
Filatotchev (2003, 2004) model, it also extends it by exploring the interdependency of 
governance structures and scale and scope economies in districts, emphasising the multi-
level nature of both governance arrangements and patterns of resource distribution and 
dependency, and their spatiality. In other words, overlapping governance structures exist 
at the level of the firm and the district, whilst resource bases and dependency at the level 
of the firm must be situated in relation to resource distribution and dependency at the 
level of the district. Moreover, it is district-level governance arrangements that integrate 
firm-level resource bases and district-level resource distribution and dependency and 
proximity lends these district-level governance arrangements alternative qualities to those 
operating at different geographical scales. The balance between internalization and 
externalization of scale and scope economies is an expression of the interdependency of 
governance and resource issues for both firms and districts. Incorporation of the resource 
base with capital dependency facilitates simultaneous consideration of transaction costs 
and agency costs as ‘information costs’ in the context of organizational evolution, with 
information costs being lower amongst actors operating in close spatial proximity 
(Casson 1997). To summarize, if the characteristics of districts are to be contrasted across 
industry and through history, then the degree of internalization of resources and the 
degree of resource dependency and transparency to external monitoring are likely to be 
important determinants of district characteristics. 
The proposed general relationships between resource bases and resource dependence 
are set out in Figure 1. As Figure 1 suggests, the characteristics of districts, and by 
extension other forms of industry structure, can be ascertained with reference to two 
characteristics. First, there is the ex ante resource base, the tangibility or intangibility of 
those resources, and their geographical location. We will address later how taking 
resource bases as ex ante needs to be problematized in order to reach a formulation that is 
historiographically satisfying. The resource base refers first of all to the resource bases of 
the individual firms that comprise the district. Examples of tangible resources include 
production capacity or local raw material sources, whereas intangible refers to R&D 
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expertise and local pools of knowledge assets. However, the resource bases of individual 
firms may, of course, also have implications for the breadth of the resource base of the 
district as whole. A district with a resource base that is in aggregate relatively narrow, for 
example, where wide firm resource bases lead to considerable replication of resources 
from firm to firm,  will be more dependent on providers of external resources. 
This note directs out attention towards the issue of resource dependence. Resource 
dependency meanwhile refers both to the degree of dependence district members have on 
each other and to the degree of dependence of all district members in the aggregate upon 
resource providers that are external to the district and are thus spatially distanced. 
Important external resources include primarily but, not only, financial capital and may 
extend to include political capital or information such as that relating to markets or 
technologies. 
The dependent variables of the model in the figure are the district characteristics. 
These include major structural characteristics such as firm-level specialization, diversity 
of activities between firms and firm-size disparities. From these will flow other 
dependent variables, including institutional arrangements, market micro-structure, 
characteristics of entrepreneurs, labour relations, competitive advantage, internal 
accounting arrangements, and so on. 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
We can now sketch some of the broad relations between configurations of resource 
bases and resource dependencies, and hence the structural, strategic and governance 
characteristics of districts.  Firstly, where firms have relatively narrow, that is specialized, 
resource bases, we can expect an accompanying specialization in economic activities. 
This specialization at the level of the firm suggests a relatively high degree of diversity 
between firms, in terms of the activities they perform, often accompanied by relatively 
low levels of size disparity between them. Firms, being more specialized, are also likely 
to be many and small. What are the governance implications of such an arrangement of 
resource bases? 
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To a large extent this will depend also on resource dependence of the district in 
aggregate and  within the district. Where firms specialise within the value chain and have 
narrow individual resource bases, the governance challenge will fall on a vertical co-
ordinating  mechanism. rather than controlling competition, as might be expected in a 
district that is more horizontally fragmented. District-level governance arrangements, 
such as networks, and will promote resource sharing though, associational organizations 
such as those found in the Birmingham Jewellery Quarter (Carnevali, 2003). Where the 
district is horizontally fragmented, with similar firms such associations might also act to 
limit competition within the district. Where handled efficiently, this will lead to enhanced 
entrepreneurial scope through information sharing and cross-fertilisation and will 
encourage a structural dynamic of spin-offs and start-ups to exploit emerging 
technological and market niches. These are the sorts of effects that, much of the district 
literature argues, flow relatively naturally from spatial proximity of actors and the 
creation of a local social milieu. Governance arrangements, largely in the form of 
networks, will be founded on dense, highly-localized linkages 
These effects will be reinforced if the district also possesses, or is able to generate the 
majority of the resources most critical to its success, that is, if it is in a position of 
relatively low external resource dependency, as in quadrant 4.  Whilst low growth  
districts may display relatively low dynamic properties  they can still persist and prosper 
over long periods of time on the basis of an ongoing refinement and reinforcement of its 
existing capabilities and advantages, a refinement that often occurs through the structural 
dynamics outlined above. Again, the Birmingham Jewellery Quarter exemplifies many of 
these processes. In sum, then, if district members are mutually relatively resource 
dependent but the district is in aggregate capital self-sufficient, equality is promoted 
within the district through arrangements to share existing resources and is facilitated 
through the effects of proximity. However, there might still be moral hazard and free-
riding problems amongst the relatively equal participant firms and district norms may be 
enforced through industry associations and agreements on issues such as price fixing. In 
these conditions, the participants have incentives to share accounting and other types of 
information, so that costs of production are known and prices can be maintained at levels 
above production cost or innovations in products or processes rapidly diffused amongst 
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firms used to working within one another. Other areas of co-operation include training, 
education and marketing. Despite these high levels of co-operation, such districts may be 
characteristically decentralised. This set of conditions will lead to districts closest to the 
classic or ‘canonical’ district of the so-called Third Italy. 
Where individual resource bases remain narrow but, aggregate dependence on external 
resource providers is high, as in quadrant 1, centralisation is promoted, as the district 
members need to create a conduit for securing new resources, a task often beyond the 
dense, localized networks created by narrow firm resource bases. Thus, conditions can 
pose major governance challenges that conflict with the balance of resource distribution 
and dependence within the district, where decentralization remains key. We can see this 
conflict in the Coventry machine tool industry, where lead ‘seed-corn’ firm Alfred 
Herbert refused the role of leadership at a national level, stymieing attempts by the 
industry to develop vital political capital (Lloyd-Jones and Lewis 2003).  
However, if an appropriate conduit between the district and external resource 
providers is found, then one likely effect is to empower the section of the district, perhaps 
a particular firm, which is delegated responsibility for securing these resources. This may 
create moral hazard and adverse selection problems within the network, where a single 
firm acts as agent for the remaining firms (Zaheer and Venkatraman 1995), in addition to 
the principal-agent relationship between the delegated firm and the resource provider. 
Accounting and accountability structures must therefore be created which operate in both 
directions and at a range of spatial scales. Reconciling these contrasting governance 
arrangements may present a considerable challenge. Internalising the relationships might 
solve these problems, for example where one firm takes over the other members of the 
district, as happened in the Widnes chemical industrial district in 1890 with the formation 
of the United Alkali Company (Popp 2003). 
As the resource base is centralized, a single firm takes over an increasing number of 
functions, for example by buying up other members of the district, thereby internalizing 
the resource bases of the constituent firm(s). Movement may also occur in the opposite 
direction through spin-offs and demergers.  Such moves would bring about a transition 
across the matrix, from quadrant 1 to quadrant 2  In industries with  extensive resource 
bases at the level of the firm, a corresponding lack of resource dependence between firms 
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and high-dependence on external financial resource providers, longer-distance 
connections attenuate the forces promoting clustering. Further characteristics will include 
high levels of generalization at the level of the firm, low levels of diversity in activity 
between firms and low levels of size disparity. The governance challenge becomes that of 
mitigating competition, effective co-ordination of large and complex resource sets and a 
powerful voice amongst external providers. In this situation, central management 
attempts to solve the moral hazard problem by resort to internal planning and 
management accounting controls, as in M-form structures. Here, the principal 
responsibility of the corporate centre is raising resources and possibly personnel 
functions, and distributing them as rationally as possible to the product divisions. Head 
offices may well migrate to metropolitan locations in order to be close to key external 
providers, reinforcing our point with regard to the spatiality of governance arrangements. 
As already noted, forces for clustering are weak under these conditions. Clustering may 
only emerge or persist as a result of simple economies of agglomeration or because of 
historic circumstances, such as the position of Widnes chemicals under ICI, or because of 
the presence of the provider of key idiosyncratic resources, such as a university or other 
research facility. 
Clusters located in quadrant 3, where individual resource bases are extensive but 
dependence on external resources is low, often face their own particular challenges. 
Firms will be generalized in their activities and show little diversity amongst themselves. 
However, under the particular conditions classically associated with clustering, 
particularly a localization of both physical and human resources, this does not necessarily 
lead, as it might in other circumstances, to a few relatively large firms existing in an 
oligopolistic state. Instead, an historically-accrued richness of localized resources 
promotes a structural dynamic of near uncontrolled entry and wide disparities in firm 
size. Districts structured in this way can demonstrate that the positive forces associated in 
the district literature with proximity do not operate with absolute inevitability. The North 
Staffordshire Potteries experienced just this situation very powerfully in the late 
nineteenth-century (Popp, 2001). 
In governance or resource dependence terms, extensive generalized resource bases 
mean there is little need to develop extensive, decentralized links or networks between 
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district members. The effects often ascribed to proximity might thus also be a response to 
resource distributions, at least in part. The articulation of such districts is primarily 
horizontal, rather than vertical, and the main challenge becomes that of controlling 
possibly rampant intra-district competition and the high-levels of entry with which such 
competition is associated. The Lancashire cotton textile industry also possessed many of 
these features and such districts may be thought of as closest to the classic ‘Marshallian’ 
formulation. However, with little monitoring and oversight from external resource 
providers and fractured internal governance mechanisms, such districts can often find it 
difficult to adjust either to radical exogenous shocks or to their own internal dynamics. 
The accountability structure of the district may include the use of interlocking 
directorships within a controlling elite, as was seen in Lancashire cotton textiles, that 
manages a looser hierarchy, through say a holding company or federal structure. 
However, these structures should not be thought of as akin to the wider networks held to 
be typical of the canonical Italian district. At best, they may be thought of as ‘capsule’ 
networks, that is, they are relatively small in membership, self-contained and 
impermeable – characteristics that do not promote an outward looking stance.   
 
 
 
Drivers 
 
The synthesis as presented thus far is static, however. It is important to ask, therefore, 
how the processes underlying transitions can be conceptualized? First, interacting 
dynamics induce movement in particular directions. Thus, the dynamic on the vertical 
axis is technological change and changes in demand conditions. On the horizontal axis 
the dynamic includes forces that impact upon the social ownership of firms, such as 
company law and rules governing financial disclosure and other aspects of corporate 
governance. As we noted above, however, changes in resource bases, in whatever 
direction, will alter the degree of resource dependency at the level of the district. 
Furthermore, because changes can be exogeneous, the rates of change in resource base 
and governance arrangements may differ. 
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Forces for change powerful enough to induce transitions across the matrix, whether 
they originate in the technological realm, in the market, or in other environmental factors, 
are very often relatively radical and discontinuous. Governance in districts, in contrast, is 
rooted very often in networks and other related structures (kinship, religion or ethnicity, 
for example). Effective monitoring and accountability are highly dependent on 
information, while information costs are in turn heavily influenced by relational 
structures and properties, including trust, all influenced to varying degrees by spatial 
effects and proximity in particular. Even as dispersed ownership and more efficient 
markets for shares emerge, governance arrangements remain socially and spatially 
embedded (pace policies for the recruitment and succession to top management positions 
to reinforce control). A practical example might include the recovery and maintenance of 
invested capital to meet outstanding financial claims. Where there are significant 
surpluses or deficits, resulting from cycle effects, financial crises or other causes, the 
reordering of such financial claims may be slowed down by legal requirements and 
vested or conflicting interests. As a socially constructed phenomenon, governance, 
especially in complex districts, is less likely to experience rapid, discontinuous change. In 
essence this is an argument for path dependence in governance arrangements. 
Furthermore, there may also occur what might be thought of as spatial dependence. In 
other words, a district rich in dense, localized governance connections may be ill-
equipped to build the wider span of linkages demanded by an emerging position of 
dependence on external resource providers. Thus, in periods of structural stress 
misalignment between resource and governance arrangements is likely to develop. For 
example the ultimate failure of Lancashire as a cotton district resulted from precisely 
such a misalignment (Filatotchev and Toms, 2003). Transition towards finding a new 
position with regard to resource bases and dependencies will only occur to the extent and 
in the direction allowed by more slowly evolving governance systems.  
Further, one must consider the growth rate, which is linked to changes in income and 
demand conditions and historically to the developmental and innovative propensities of 
the resource base. If the asset/resource base of the district needs to be modified in 
response to these changes, the degree of resource dependence increases, with 
consequences for the spatiality of governance arrangements as we have already indicated. 
 21
As Hobson noted over a century ago, ‘the art of living must continually change, and each 
change alters the value attached to the several forms of consumption, and so to the 
industrial processes engaged in the supply of different utilities’ (Hobson 1906: 159). 
Adjustment to such changed conditions is far from inevitable, because ‘the opening out of 
new sources of supply or new markets for sale may quickly overbear the strength which 
old districts have inherited from part conditions’ (Marshall 1919: 287).  
The precise characteristics of the district will depend upon which of these forces are 
the strongest. For example, the forces of innovation and technical change may be strong, 
creating high dependence on financial resource providers but which may be inadequate to 
the task (for example, the capital markets of the industrial revolution, Wilson 1995). The 
converse can also be true; weak forces of change in the asset base and low technical 
discovery coexisting with powerful governance agents that demand exit or restructuring. 
Successful districts might be expected where both aspects work positively as sufficient 
and necessary conditions. It follows that districts might be less successful not just where 
neither operates positively, but also in cases where one of the two fails to operate. In such 
cases, districts might become subject to a variety of different types of ‘lock-in’ (Hudson, 
2005; Chapman, 2005; Popp and Wilson, forthcoming).  Researchers have identified 
three principal types or sources of lock-in: the cognitive, the political and the functional. 
In the context of this paper, each may be thought of as reflecting an inability or an 
unwillingness to reorder resource bases to meet changed circumstances, in some 
instances compounded by the notion of spatial dependence introduced above. Such lock-
ins represent, then, the positions of resource dependence in which actors find themselves, 
these structuring the range of choices they have available to them and the frameworks 
within which they choose from the different options that are available.  Such lock-ins, 
then, are not given but instead are created over time and are explicable only as the 
outcomes of concrete sequences of events. They are not inevitable, but are instead about 
choices made and not made. 
One brief example, the Widnes chemical industry in the later nineteenth century, will 
be used to indicate how our synthesis can aid us in understanding district dynamics and 
structural transitions. Founded at the mid-century, the Widnes alkali industry was, until 
the 1880s, characterised by relatively narrow resource bases at the level of the firm and 
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relatively low aggregate resource dependence, locating the industry in quadrant 4 of 
Figure 1. Firms were relatively and increasingly specialized in their activities, and thus 
increasingly dependent on each other, and showed little significant size disparity. In 
response, the industry had managed to elaborate an effective decentralized, district-level 
governance system largely based on personal networks forged, for example, through a 
pattern of ex-employees spinning-off new enterprises and operating at an intensely 
localized level. Firms shared information and, through both formal and informal 
mechanisms, collaborated to build social and other capital at the aggregate level. 
Information costs within the district were low, access to knowledge and other key 
resources good and accountability, in terms of behaviours affecting other stakeholders, 
high, conforming to many aspects of the district literature with regard to the effects of 
proximity. 
However, changing conditions in the 1880s presented radical new challenges as 
Brunner, Mond and Co. introduced the highly price-competitive Solvay process for the 
manufacture of alkali. Centralization became a pressing priority in order to achieve a 
lasting and coordinated response. The result was the formation, through merger, of the 
United Alkali Company in 1890. Crucially, in moving towards merger, the Widnes 
manufacturers had, in their prior experience of cooperation, a foundation on which to 
build in combination with the extra-district of leading agents to other UK centres of 
chemical manufacturing. Existing governance arrangements and good relations enabled 
them to frame and make the necessary choices over the reconfiguration of resources. 
Through merger, resource bases were widened and links to external resources providers 
deepened and strengthened, shifting the cluster from quadrant 1 to quadrant 2 (Popp, 
2003).  
Thus, whilst both forces inducing transitions and the mechanisms mediating them 
within the model – particularly, misalignment between resources and governance – 
explain discontinuous development in business structures, specific outcomes in different 
districts are contingent, time-dependent and empirical questions. The key point is the 
non-deterministic nature of the processes - transitions are possible in all directions and 
are reversible. These final points signal the need briefly to address some historiographical 
issues. 
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Conclusions: writing the histories of districts 
 
Despite our claims that discerning and understanding concrete outcomes in specific 
spatial and temporal locations is an empirical question, and that the model we are 
proposing is non-deterministic, it might still be contended by some that this work is 
largely ahistoric – or even social scientistic or economistic. 
First, it is worth noting that the insights we have tried to develop here are derived from 
a large number of ‘traditional’ and empirical historical studies of English districts. Our 
method has, then, been largely inductive. What we have attempted to provide should be 
thought of as not a model of district dynamics or even a taxonomy of district types, but 
instead as the field of forces within which specific districts may be placed in order that 
we can better understand their individual and collective histories. Moreover, despite the 
presence of powerful forces promoting regularities in patterns of development across 
different districts, these can be and often are disrupted, principally by two factors; 
contingency and agency – a point made earlier in relation to the concept of lock-in. In 
exploring these issues, history must remain the ultimate referent. Nonetheless, we reject 
the claim that business and organizational history has nothing to gain from an 
engagement with the social sciences – whether that is with economics or sociology. 
A perhaps equally serious change is that it is an historical fallacy to take resource 
bases as ex ante. Beyond the simple facts of natural resource endowments, and these are 
rarely important in the long-run history of many districts, resource bases, both at the level 
of the firm and the district, are clearly made, not given. Moreover, they are created by 
human actors within the social arrangements in which they find themselves embedded, 
social arrangements that do much to shape their access to economic resources and thus 
their resource dependence. Resource bases and resource dependencies are then over the 
long-run co-determining. Crucially, that highly complex process of co-determination can 
only be properly understood through the writing of rich and nuanced narratives that 
eschew both the teleologism inherent in the Chandlerian approach and the search for the 
‘ideal-typical’ that has come to characterize much of the highly influential Italian 
literature on districts. 
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Figure 1 Resources, governance and industry characteristics 
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